The Obama Bubble

(c) Anthony Mansell/ Shepard Fairey

Transatlantic relations are most often articulated by those in power on either side, providing status updates filled with constant references to shared histories, shared values and shared cultures. Whilst these are all true, the crucial questions for the EU-US partnership is whether they have shared interests, shared views and shared priorities. It is these that will decide how much their future is to be a shared experience.

Enter Jose Manuel Barroso, European Commission President, who caused a stir with an interview given to The Times this week. His comment that ‘the transatlantic relationship is not living up to its potential’ amounted to laying blame for his current perceived disconnect firmly on the steps of the White House. In particular, Barroso spoke of ‘current conditions’ giving an outstanding opportunity to form closer ties on issues, which essentially means the Obama administration. The fallout from these criticisms have been focused upon insurmountable public expectations from European Obamaniacs during the 2008 campaign, and the diversity of thought within Europe that makes it hard to coordinate policy. Whilst these are accurate observations of the particular incident and provide a context to Barroso’s complaint, the deeper question to analyse is how much European dissent matters for American policymakers?

Audacious hype

Expectations are all too often seen as rational and certain when they must always be cast in the long shadow of the future. They need to be backed up by information and confidence, not blind faith, and the more accurate information you are the more likely a prediction or expectancy is of coming to fruition. But they are not certainties.

As a point of example, it was the expectation of investment banks in the summer of 2008 that they would receive a bail out from the US government. When that expectation was shown to be untrue in the case of Lehman Brothers, that triggered a crisis of confidence in the financial sector. The main point here is that an expectation can be based in good knowledge, good information and good theory, but that does not make it certain. In finance this presents itself in bubbles that all too often burst on the overconfident. In politics, it is best seen in hype.

Obama’s political campaign for president captured the imaginations of countless Europeans (this author included), who saw the candidate as a genuine change not only from George W Bush but from the perception of past US presidents. When speaking internationally Obama did relate to issues such as climate change that were overlooked by the Bush administration and made many advocates believe that the missing piece of the jigsaw had been filled, and now there would be the solutions on the horizon. From that, the expectations were always set to be raised beyond measure, and those who speculated on the abilities of Obama to change the world now feel short-changed. Nowhere is this more true than in Europe.

The reality check:

Barroso appeared determined to express disappointment at the US president in his interview. However, what is it that Europe wants from Obama?  Those caught up in the hype of the campaign were all to keen to ignore the small print: The checks and balances that prevents the White House doing as it pleases and the ingrained interests in the United States that did not disappear or lose relevance upon Obama’s inauguration. And it is these interests and priorities that are moving away from Europe.

The movement of power, as is incessantly noted, is eastwards and southwards towards the ‘emerging markets’. As a consequence, the political relevance of Europe as a whole has declined relative to the rest of the world – a development many in Europe have put up little resistance to. The economic giant has had no problem being politically dwarfed after the Cold War and up to this point. Given the reality is now a geopolitical landscape where European – and to an extent American – primacy can not be taken for granted, the focus of each should be stretching further and further afield. Obama maintains the priority of these newer regions at the cost of remaining attached to Europe by the hip. Many Europeans remain disbelieving in their increasing treatment as ‘just another region’ by the United States, and expect more from Washington.

Obama was a way out of this problem for European policymakers, the main source of discontent at the 44th President. A new president speaking on the same terms as they were, and looking to shift America’s role in the world seemed to affirm that the European way of thinking was in the ascendency. However, the reality has been that the hearts and minds Obama wishes to win are not in London or Berlin or Brussels but in Moscow and Cairo – not to mention in the US itself.

If Barroso was expecting Obama to look to Europe as the main pillar of his foreign policy, then he has misread the politics. Europe remains important to America, but not exclusive, and there is no reason to expect so much more attention and pandering to European interests and issues. If there is an opportunity for Europe and the United States to cooperate that is slipping away, as Barroso has suggested, then Brussels would do well to provide that impetus and move on the things it cares about.

Henry Kissinger famously said that if he needed to contact Europe, he did not know what number to call.Maybe the time has come that Europe should stop waiting by the telephone.