No change? The prospects for Russo-American co-operation

(c) President of the Russian Federation

American President Barack Obama visits Russia this week to discuss nuclear disarmament. His visit comes at a time when relations between the two old adversaries are at a low point following Russia’s war in Georgia last summer. Russian leaders, especially Vladimir Putin, the prime minister, monopolise on anti-American sentiments for domestic gain and the two states have cooled their relations for the past decade. Nevertheless, there will likely be co-operation in areas of shared interests.

The main topic of the visit, nuclear disarmament, is in both countries’ interest. Neither benefits from maintaining expensive stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Both benefit from mutual reductions in the size of their nuclear deterrent. Russia will be especially keen; it does not want another arms race like the one that bankrupted the Soviet Union. It is unsurprising that Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian president, have already agreed to reduce their number of nuclear warheads to below 1,700. Despite cool relations and domestic rhetoric, the national interest prevails.

A similar common interest could produce co-operation in other areas. Both nations have an interest in checking the rising power of China, whose emergence as a great power would damage the power of both Russia and America. Both also have an interest in battling Islamist terrorism at home and abroad, especially al-Qaeda. Although both nations sneer at the others’ tactics—Russia opposed George W. Bush’s war in Iraq and America opposed Putin’s clampdown in Chechnya—both still have an interest in preventing terrorist activities worldwide. In these areas, like nuclear disarmament, the two powers could co-operate.

However, there remain serious conflicts between America and Russia. The major conflict concerns former Soviet states in eastern Europe. As evidenced by aggressive energy policies and possible electoral interference, Russia remains deeply interested in maintaining its sphere of influence in its near abroad. It is hostile to NATO expansion and EU accession for former Soviet states. It views the colour revolutions in eastern Europe as products of American interference rather than national democracy. American interests lie in checking Russian power over eastern Europe, expanding its own influence in the area through improved relations and expansion of European defence capacities (i.e., NATO expansion and European Common Foreign and Security Policy). America seeks to install an anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic to defend attacks from Middle Eastern countries such as Iran; Russia views this as a threat to its own security and its sphere of influence. Conflicts over influence in eastern Europe remain difficult to overcome.

Russia guards its national sovereignty fiercely, as all states do. It is hostile to interference in its internal affairs and defends the principle of absolute national sovereignty. Its leaders are currently pursuing an authoritarian style of governing that erodes Russian democracy and openness. After a brief flirtation with capitalist democracy, the Kremlin is taking back power and control. American interests lie in democratisation. A more democratic Russia would be more open, more peaceful and a more positive influence on eastern Europe. Russia’s slide back into authoritarianism makes the country less predictable, more troublesome and less trustworthy. Russian nationalisation of energy industries damage American commercial interests in Russia, especially as Russia has used such industries as a tool of foreign policy.

Russia remains distant from ‘the West’. It is pulling back from global organisations, such as the WTO, that would link its interests to those of Western power. It has no interest in NATO—it still sees the organisation as hostile since its attack on the Serbs in 1999. It prefers a more independent, and antagonistic, foreign policy. Western organisations do not serve its interests. This makes it difficult to bring Russia in from the cold; the opportunity to engage Russia came in the 1990s but the West missed it. America has a clear interest in bringing Russia into the Western sphere; its interests would then align more closely with America. Co-operation would then benefit both Russia and America as trade and common interests replace conflict and competition in eastern Europe. Changing Russian interests would be expensive and require concessions but would benefit America in the long-term.

Obama seeks more co-operation with Russia and improved relations. This is certainly possible on nuclear disarmament, balancing Chinese power and tacking terrorism (assuming America can palate Russian anti-terrorism policy). However, co-operation will not emerge where interests remain divergent. The two nations will continue to oppose one another in eastern Europe and over Russian energy policy. Co-operation is such areas needs more than kinder words; it needs Russian interests to realign with American interests. This is unlikely unless America offers some sweet carrots or the balance of power changes—Russian is currently powerful enough to defend its interests. Until national interests or the balance of power change, the two nations will continue to co-operate in a limited manner where their interests coincide but compete where they clash; things will look similar to relations under Bush.