Is change coming to Iran?

(c) Hamed Saber

Following a contested election, Tehran has erupted in protest. Suspicions voting patterns and the speedy announcements of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election led to accusations of vote rigging. Hundreds of thousands (some say millions) or young Iranians to demand that their votes be counted in favour of reformer Mir Hossein Mousavi. The regime responded with arrests and beatings.

Ahmadinejad does have a good claim to victory having won votes distributing potatoes to the poor. The elections are dubious but the few reliable pre-election polls did give Ahmadinejad a lead (raising the question of why the regime engaged in such dubious activities). Odd regional vote shifts and excess turnouts suggest vote rigging, but Mousavi does not necessarily have majority support in Iran.

In terms of policy, a Mousavi presidency would bring a minimal change to Iran. The president has little independent power over policy (including foreign policy). Iranian interests would remain consistent and the military-clerical establishment is unlikely to allow any president to walk away from Iran’s nuclear programme or its sponsorship of terrorist organisations. Mousavi has a conservative record from his previous stint in power and he would be unable to reform Iran without the permission of the Supreme Leader. While Mousavi might say nicer things than Ahmadinejad, he would do little differently. A Mousavi presidency is no panacea.

Nevertheless, there are a significant number of Iranians challenging the legitimacy of the election. They do not accept Ahmadinejad and want their quasi-democratic rights respected by the regime. They may be repressed, but the protesters are demanding change. Even if Mousavi is not the reformer he appears, the youths on the streets of Tehran want him to be. Even if Ahmadinejad has won the popular vote, there still exists a young and vocal minority challenging the regime. The regime cannot ignore this challenge to its power. A significant dissident voice demands a listening.

Presently, the protestors and the regime are engaged in a game of brinksmanship. Protesters are staying on the streets while the security services and loyalist militias harass them. Thus far, the situation has not developed into a full-blown battle for Tehran. However, unless one side backs down escalation is likely. Like all regimes facing a challenge, the ruling elites have two options. They can enact moderate reforms to cling onto power or continue to coerce the crowds into obedience.

Reform might appease the protestors and allow the regime to maintain power. Plus ça change. Protesters would return home satisfied that the regime had met their demands. This might mean a recount, a Mousavi presidency or even a change of Supreme Leader. Iran might open up a little and the regime would remain secure after appeasing dissenters. However, reform might backfire. Like glasnost and perestroika, the process might escape the control of the regime and destroy it.

Coercion would reinforce the regime’s control if it caused protesters to stand down (as happened with the Iranian student protests of 1999). The Iranian Revolutionary Guard and their associated militias could probably overpower the hundreds of thousands of protesters, who would then have to back down from their ‘green’ revolution. The regime could re-assert its authority and clamp down on dissent as it did in 1999. However, this might result in all-out conflict if protesters resisted. It would not dispel the demands for change; it would drive them underground where they could build up strength. The regime would not drain the reservoir of discontent but just strengthen the dam.

Currently, there is conflict within the regime about which strategy to adopt (and something of a power struggle). Some want moderate reform and others coercion—event the Revolutionary Guard is split. The result of this present crisis depends on who wins and whether the regime or the protesters blink first. If moderates win and the regime blinks, then the protesters might win moderate reform. If the hardliners win and protesters blink (or have their eyes forced shut), as looks more likely, the regime will re-entrench its power and the lives of Iranians will get worse. If neither side blinks, Iran might descend into a bloodier conflict from which no one escapes.